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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

SHERRY HARRIS I

I

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

I
I

vs.

Case No. 15797

/'

BALLARD L. HARRIS,
Defendant and
Appellant.

I
I
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for modification of a Decree of Divorce
brought by the Plaintiff and Respondent, Sherry Harris, against
the Defendant and Appellant, Ballard L. Harris.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon an evidentiary hearing held before the Honorable
VeNoy Christofferson, Judge of the First District Court, the
Court found a sufficient change in circumstances to increase
the child support to the sum of $75.00 per month per child
for the parties' three children.

(R-39)

The Trial Court ordered
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-2that the child support for the three minor children shall be
until said children attain the age of 21 years or until they
otherwise become self-supporting.

(R-40)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks to reverse the Order of the Lower
Court, and the specific ruling that children attain the age
of majority in divorce proceedings upon attaining the age of
21 years or otherwise become self-supporting.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were divorced on the 20th day of June, 1970,
upon a hearing before the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, wherein
the Defendant and Appellant was ordered to pay child support
in the sum of $60.00 per month as and for child support on
the three minor children of the parties, and that such payment
0

would be ordered until said children reached their majority
or until the further order of the Court.
That the issue born of the marriage are Angela, who,
is 18, Troy, who is 16, and Chris, who is 12 years of age at
the time the modification hearing was held on February 6, 1978.

(R-51
The Respondent in the Lower Court at the evidentiary

-2-
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hearing was permitted to testify as to the expenses of the
parties' 18-year old daughter incident to said daughter's college
expenses.

(R-5)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THE AGE OF MAJORITY IN
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS rs 21 YEARS OF AGE.
The Lower Court specifically held that the age of majority
in divorce cases is 21 years of age pursuant to statute.
~

(R-

- 101
That Utah Code Annotated, 15-2-1, concerns the period

of minority as follows:
The period of minority extends in males and
females to the age 18 years; but all minors
obtain their majority by marriage. It is
further provided that courts in divorce actions
may order support to age 21. (As amended 1975)
Prior to the legislature enactment in 1975, the former
statute provided that the age of majority extended in the males
to the age of 21 and in females to the age of 18, but that
all minors obtained their majority through marriage.
The Court previously held in Stanton v. Stanton, 564
P.2d 303 (1977), as follows:
The Amendment to Section 15-2-1 has served to
further clarify the status of Utah law and
establishes as a matter of public policy the age
of majority for both sexes at age 18.

-3-
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The Washington Court in Childers v. Childers, 552 P.2d
83 (19761, was presented with an issue very analogous to the
instant matter, wherein the Defendant appealed from an order
requiring him to pay support for his son until such time as
the son ceased being enrolled in a university or other form
of higher education and ceased to be otherwise dependent upon
the parties for support.
The Washington Court in Childers v. Childers, cited
supra, held that a parent owes a duty of support to his children
only during their minority with the exception that a parent
may have a continuing duty to care for a defective adult child.
The Washington Court in examining the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution set forth the basis for determining
whether a denial of equal protection exists in holding:
When a statute establishes a class to receive
different treatment, these constitutional provisions require that:
"classifications must meet and satisfy two
requirements:
(1)
The legislation must apply
alike to all persons within a designated class;
and (2) reasonable ground must exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within a
class and those who do not."
The Washington Court determined that the first criteria
was met, in that the statute applied equally to children of
divorced parents.

However, the Court held that the second

criteria was not met, and stated that:
-4-
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There is no reasonable ground to make a distinction between adult children of divorced parents
and adult children of married parents. Of course
there is good reason for the State to take partic~lar
interest in minor children of divorce parents.***
But the distinction vanishes when the child
becomes 18. There is no logical reason to
require divorce parents to support their
children for an indefinite period into their
majority while married parents are free to
bid their children a fiscal farewell at age
18.
The issue considered by the Washington Court is analogous
to the instant matter under U.C.A., 15-2-1, except the Utah
Statute does not apply alike to all children of divorced parents.
That the Trial Court is vested with legislative authority to
order support in divorce cases for the,children to age 21,
but is not required to order support to age 21 for majority
attained at age 18.
The Washington Court in Childers v. Childers, cited
supra, further held that the father's liability under a Decree
of Support ceases when the child reaches his majority and that
such is true where the Decree recites that such order of support
continues "until the further Order of this Court", for the
reason that such child upon attaining the age of majority is
no longer a ward of the Court and there is no duty to support
adult children.
That the Kansas Supreme Court in Rice v. Rice, 518 P.2d
477 (1974), held that a child's father is not required to make

-5-
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child support payments beyond the child's minority unless an
intent to the contrary is clearly expressed and that the child's
support obligation terminates at the age of 18 years, even
though the Decree was entered prior to the effective date of
the Kansas Statute setting forth 18 years of age as the age
of majority.
The Kansas Supreme Court further held in Rice v. Rice,
cited supra, that a child has no vested right in future child
support in a Decree of Divorce which provides that the child's
father is to make child support payments until the child reaches
the age of majority for the duty or obligation imposed is terminatec
as of the effective date of the statute amending the age of
majority from 21 years to 18 years of age.
The New Mexico Court similarly in Mason v. Mason, 507
P.2d 781 (1973), held that minority is a legal status conditioned
primarily upon age, and that it was the father's duty to support
his children only during their minority, unless married or
emancipated prior to the age at which said children reach their
age of majority.
Further, the New Mexico Court held that the father's
liability was to the age of 18, although the age of majority
was 21 years at the time the Decree was entered where the Divorce
Decree provided that the father's liability to pay support
~or

the children would be until the children reached their

-6-
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respective age of majority.
It appears clear that the Court misapplied u.c.A., 152-1, as amended 1975, which clearly sets 18 years of age as
the age of majority in stating:
For clarification of a new statute as to when
majority is reached, that shall be 21 or until
they otherwise become self-supporting. Selfsupporting shall be defined as the minimum
wage as set by the government.
Therefore, it is submitted that the age of majority
being a legal status rather than a vested right and the Utah
Legislature having set the age of majority as 18 years of age,
requiring a divorced parent to provide child support beyond
the age of majority when a father who is not divorced is not
required to support his child after said child reaches the
age of majority violates the Appellant's constitutional right
to equal protection under the law pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
POINT II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWER IN EXTENDING
THE AGE OF SUPPORT TO THE APPELLANT'S MINOR DAUGHTER.
That at the time the Decree of Divorce was awarded on
or about June 16, 1970, u.c.A., 15-2-1, provided that:
The period of minority extends in males to the age
of 21 years and in females to that of 18 yea:s;
but all minors obtain their majority by marriage.

-7-
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That the Supreme Court of Utah in Harmon v. Harmon,
491 P.2d 231 (19711, held by referring to u.c.A., 30-3-5:
In the language of the statute, and as stated
numerous times by the decisions of this Court,
these propositions are firmly established:
(1)
That such proceedings are equitable; and (2) that
under the authority conferred "to make subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to *** the
custody of the children and their support and
maintenance***", the Court retains jurisdiction
to deal with such matters in supplemental proceedings with the same authority and in the same
manner as it could deal with them originally.
That the Utah Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Mitchell,
527 P.2d 1359 (1974), it was reiterated that the Trial Court
has the power to make such subsequent changes in respect to
support and maintenance as such Trial Court could have dealt
with originally.
Therefore, the Trial Court in entering a Decree of Divorce
in June, 1970, was limited to ordering child support as to
females to the age of 18 years, and by ordering the Appellant
to provide child support until Appellant's 18-year old daughter
reaches the age of 21 years upon the Respondent's request for
modification, the Trial Court has entered an order that said
Trial Court was prohibited from ordering at the time the Decree
of Divorce was granted to Respondent and is clearly beyond the
authority conferred upon the Lower Court.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT 21 IS THE AGE
OF MAJORITY IN DIVORCE CASES COULD BE THE BASIS
UPON WHICH THE COURT ENTERED ITS MODIFICATION ORDER.
Lt is clear from the Court pronouncement, that the age
of 21 or until the child becomes self-supporting shall be the
age of majority.

(R-40) is contrary to U.C.A., 15-2-1, which

specifically provides that the age of minority extends only
to the age of 18 years and not to the age of 21 years.
Therefore, it appears that the Lower Court Order requiring
the Appellant to provide child support to the age of 21 years
or until the children become self-supporting based upon the
Court's determination that the period of minority is 21 years
in matters of divorce being an erroneous application of U.C.A.,
15-2-1, it is necessary that the instant matter be remanded
for proper consideration of u.C.A., 15-2-1.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court,
that the imposition and requiring of child support to the age
of 21 years is in denial of the Appellant's right to equal
protection under the law, in that the father who has not become
divorced from his spouse has no obligation to provide support
to the child and can give such child a fiscal farewell upon
such child attaining the age of majority.
-9-
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It is further submitted, that the age of majority in
the State of Utah by virtue of U.C.A., 15-2-1 and the Court's
Decision in the 1977 Stanton case is 18 years of age.
It is further submitted that the Lower Court exceeded
its power of modifying the Decree of Divorce entered prior
to the legislative change of u.c.A., 15-2-1 in 1975, in that
the Lower Court could not have ordered the Defendant to provide
child support for the parties' daughter, Angela, now at the
age of 18 years.
1978.

Respectfully submitted

Attorney for Appellant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
A copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant
was posted in the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed to
the Attorney for the Respondent, I. Gordon Huggins, First Security
Bank Building, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this
1978.

_j'___

day of July,
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~nnine Stowell,'~etarY
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